I Was Depressed, But Am Much Better Now…


After I read some posts on others’ blogs, I really do feel much better. Wanna know which ones I read? Here they are:

“NO ENDORSEMENT, NO NEGOTIATION–NO NEGOTIATION, NO SECURITIZATION” On Liberty Road Media: http://libertyroadmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/20/no-endorsement-no-negotiation-no-negotiation-no-securitization/

and I read this and it helped too!:

Ineptocracy from here:
http://tomfernandez28.com/2014/06/20/ineptocracy-3/

Of course this Helped a lot!:

http://www.newser.com/story/188674/miss-usa-doesnt-know-her-state-capital.html
but I actually read that here:
https://wordpress.com/

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Sentiments of US District Judge, Jed S. Rakoff – We Need More Judges Like This One!


I was reading some information about the financial crisis in this country (USA), and ran across a paper written by US District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff.  If we had more Judges with the mind of this one, we would not be in nearly as bad a shape as we are in.  I have not yet figured out how the Judges justify allowing foreclosures, when they know for a fact that the Banks and their attorneys are creating fraudulent documents, committing perjury in their Courtrooms, and are breaking so many laws, that it has become the norm…  

Read what Honorable Judge Jed S. Rakoff says:  http://www.ft.com/cms/cb1e43f2-4be6-11e3-8203-00144feabdc0.pdf

11/12/13
Why Have No High Level Executives Been Prosecuted In Connection With The Financial Crisis?
by Jed S. Rakoff
(U.S. District Judge)

Five years have passed since the onset of what is sometimes called the Great Recession. While the economy has slowly improved, there are still millions of Americans leading lives of quiet desperation: without jobs, without resources, without hope.

Who was to blame? Was it simply a result of negligence, of the kind of inordinate risk-taking commonly called a “bubble,” of an imprudent but innocent failure to maintain adequate reserves for a rainy day? Or was it the result, at least in part, of fraudulent practices, of dubious mortgages portrayed as sound risks and packaged into ever-more-esoteric financial instruments, the fundamental weaknesses of which were intentionally obscured?

If it was the former – if the recession was due, at worst, to a lack of caution – then the criminal law has no role to play in the aftermath. For, in all but a few circumstances (not here relevant), the fierce and fiery weapon called criminal prosecution is directed at intentional misconduct, and nothing less. If the Great Recession was in no part the handiwork of intentionally fraudulent practices by high-level executives, then to prosecute such executives criminally would be “scapegoating” of the most shallow and despicable kind.

But if, by contrast, the Great Recession was in material part the product of intentional fraud, the failure to prosecute those responsible must be judged one of the more egregious failures of the criminal justice system in many years.Indeed, it would stand in striking contrast to the increased success that federal prosecutors have had over the past 50 years or so in bringing to justice even the highest level figures who orchestrated mammoth frauds. Thus, in the 1970’s, in the aftermath of the “junk bond” bubble that, in many ways, was a precursor of the more recent bubble in mortgage-backed securities, the progenitors of the fraud were all successfully prosecuted, right up to Michael Milken. Again, in the 1980’s, the so-called savings-and-loan crisis, which again had some eerie parallels to more recent events, resulted in the successful criminal prosecution of more than 800 individuals, right up to Charles Keating. And, again, the widespread accounting frauds of the 1990’s, most vividly represented by Enron and WorldCom, led directly to the successful prosecution of such previously respected C.E.O.’s as Jeffrey Skilling and Bernie Ebbers.

In striking contrast with these past prosecutions, not a single high level executive has been successfully prosecuted in  connection with the recent financial crisis, and given the fact that most of the relevant criminal provisions are governed by a five-year statute of limitations, it appears very likely that none will be. It may not be too soon, therefore, to ask why.

One possibility, already mentioned, is that no fraud was committed. This possibility should not be  discounted. Every case is different, and I, for one, have no opinion as to whether criminal fraud was committed in any given instance.

 But the stated opinion of those government entities asked to examine the financial crisis overall is not that no fraud was committed. Quite the contrary. For example, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, in its final report, uses variants of the word “fraud” no fewer than 157 times in describing what led to the crisis, concluding that there was a “systemic breakdown,” not just in  accountability, but also in ethical behavior. As the Commission found, the signs of fraud were everywhere to be seen, with the number of reports of suspected mortgage fraud rising 20-fold between 1998 and 2005 and then doubling again in the next four years. As early as 2004, FBI Assistant Director Chris Swecker, was publicly warning of the “pervasive problem” of mortgage fraud, driven by the voracious demand for mortgagebacked securities. Similar warnings, many from within the financial community, were disregarded, not because they were  viewed as inaccurate, but because, as one high level banker put it, “A decision was made that ‘We’re going to have to hold our nose and start buying the product if we want to stay in business.’”

Without multiplying examples, the point is that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the prevailing view of many government officials (as well as others) was that the crisis was in material respects the product of intentional fraud. In a nutshell, the fraud, they argued, was a simple one. Subprime mortgages, i.e., mortgages of dubious creditworthiness, increasingly provided the sole collateral for highly-leveraged securities that were marketed as triple-A, i.e., of very low risk. How could this transformation of a sow’s ear into a silk purse be accomplished unless someone dissembled along the way?

While officials of the Department of Justice have been more circumspect in describing the roots of the financial crisis than have the various commissions of inquiry and other government agencies, I have seen nothing to indicate their disagreement with the widespread conclusion that fraud at every level permeated the bubble in mortgage-backed securities. Rather, their position has been to excuse their failure to prosecute high level individuals for fraud in connection with the financial crisis on one or more of three grounds:

First, they have argued that proving fraudulent intent on the part of the high level management of the banks and companies involved has proved difficult. It is undoubtedly true that the ranks of top management were several levels removed from those who were putting together the collateralized debt obligations and other securities offerings that were based on dubious mortgages; and the people generating the mortgages themselves were often at other companies and thus even further removed. And I want to stress again that I have no opinion as to whether any given top executive had knowledge of the dubious nature of the underlying mortgages, let alone fraudulent intent. But what I do find surprising is that the Department of Justice should view the proving of intent as so difficult in this context. Who, for example, were generating the so-called “suspicious activity” reports of mortgage fraud that, as mentioned, increased so hugely in the years leading up to the crisis? Why, the banks themselves. A top level banker, one might argue, confronted with increasing evidence from his own and other banks that mortgage fraud was increasing, might have inquired as to why his bank’s mortgage-based securities continued to receive triple-A ratings?  And if, despite these and other reports of suspicious activity, the executive failed to make such inquiries, might it be because he did not want to know what such inquiries would reveal?  

This, of course, is what is known in the law as “willful blindness” or “conscious disregard.” It is a well-established basis on which federal prosecutors have asked juries to infer intent, in cases involving complexities, such as accounting treatments, at least as esoteric as those involved in the events leading up to the financial crisis. And while some federal courts have occasionally expressed qualifications about the use of the willful blindness approach to prove intent, the Supreme Court has consistently approved it. As that Court stated most recently in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011), “The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.” Thus, the Department’s claim that proving intent in the financial crisis context is particularly difficult may strike some as doubtful.

Second, and even weaker, the Department of Justice has sometimes argued that, because the institutions to whom mortgagebacked securities were sold were themselves sophisticated investors, it might be difficult to prove reliance. Thus, in  defending the failure to prosecute high level executives for frauds arising from the sale of mortgage-backed securities, the then head of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, told PBS that “in a criminal case … I have to prove not only that you made a false statement but that you intended to commit a crime, and also that the other side of the transaction relied on what you were saying. And frankly, in many of the securitizations and the kinds of transactions we’re talking about, in reality you had very sophisticated counterparties on both sides. And so even though one side may have said something was dark blue when really we can say it was sky blue, the other side of the transaction, the other sophisticated party, wasn’t relying at all on the description of the color.”

Actually, given the fact that these securities were bought and sold at lightning speed, it is by no means obvious that even a sophisticated counterparty would have detected the problems with the arcane, convoluted mortgage-backed derivatives they were being asked to purchase. But there is a more fundamental problem with the above-quoted statement from the former head of the Criminal Division, which is that it totally misstates the law.  In actuality, in a criminal fraud case the Government is never required to prove reliance, ever. The reason, of course, is that would give a crooked seller a license to lie whenever he was  dealing with a sophisticated counterparty.  The law, however, says that society is harmed when a seller purposely lies about a material fact, even if the immediate purchaser does not rely on that particular fact, because such misrepresentations create problems for the market as a whole. And surely there never was a situation in which the sale of dubious mortgage-backed securities created more of a huge problem for the marketplace, and society as a whole, than in the recent financial crisis.

The third reason the Department has sometimes given for not bringing these prosecutions is that to do so would itself harm the economy. Thus, Attorney General Holder himself told Congress that “it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with indications that if we do prosecute – if we do bring a criminal charge – it will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.” To a federal judge, who takes an oath to apply the law equally to rich and to poor, this excuse — sometimes labeled the “too big to jail” excuse – is disturbing, frankly, in what it says about the
Department’s apparent disregard for equality under the law.

In fairness, however, Mr. Holder was referring to the prosecution of financial institutions, rather than their
C.E.O.’s. But if we are talking about prosecuting individuals, the excuse becomes entirely irrelevant; for no one that I know of has ever contended that a big financial institution would collapse if one or more of its high level executives were prosecuted, as opposed to the institution itself.

Without multiplying examples further, my point is that the Department of Justice has never taken the position that all the top executives involved in the events leading up to the financial crisis were innocent, but rather has offered one or another excuse for not criminally prosecuting them – excuses that, on inspection, appear unconvincing. So, you might ask, what’s really going on here? I don’t claim to have any inside information about the real reasons why no such prosecutions have been brought, but I take the liberty of offering some speculations, for your consideration or amusement as the case may be.

At the outset, however, let me say that I totally discount the argument sometimes made that no such prosecutions have been brought because the top prosecutors were often people who previously represented the financial institutions in question and/or were people who expected to be representing such
institutions in the future: the so-called “revolving door.” In my experience, every federal prosecutor, at every level, is seeking to make a name for him-or-herself, and the best way to do that is by prosecuting some high level person. While companies that are indicted almost always settle, individual defendants whose careers are at stake will often go to trial. And if the Government wins such a trial, as it usually does, the prosecutor’s reputation is made.My point is that whatever small influence the “revolving door” may have in discouraging certain white-collar prosecutions is more than offset, at least in the case of prosecuting high-level individuals, by the career-making benefits such prosecutions confer on the successful prosecutor.  So, one asks again, why haven’t we seen such prosecutions growing out of the financial crisis? I offer, by way of speculation, three influences that I think, along with others, have had the effect of limiting such prosecutions.

First, the prosecutors had other priorities. Some of these were completely understandable. For example, prior to 2001, the FBI had more than 1,000 agents assigned to investigating financial frauds, but after 9/11 many of these agents were shifted to anti-terrorism work. Who can argue with that?  Eventually, it is true, new agents were hired for some of the vacated spots in fraud detection; but this is not a form of detection easily learned and recent budget limitations have only exacerbated the problem.

Of course, the FBI is not the primary investigator of fraud in the sale of mortgage-backed securities; that responsibility lies mostly with the S.E.C. But at the very time the financial crisis was breaking, the S.E.C. was trying to deflect criticism from its failure to detect the Madoff fraud, and this led it to concentrate on other Ponzi-like schemes, which for awhile were, along with accounting frauds, its chief focus. More recently, the S.E.C. has been hard hit by budget limitations, and this has not only made it more difficult to assign the kind of manpower the kinds of frauds we are talking about require, but also has led S.E.C. enforcement to focus on the smaller, easily resolved cases that will beef up their statistics when they go to Congress begging for money.

As for the Department of Justice proper, a decision was made around 2009 to spread the investigation of these financial fraud cases among numerous U.S. Attorney’s Offices, many of which had little or no prior experience in investigating and prosecuting sophisticated financial frauds. At the same time, the U.S. Attorney’s Office with the greatest expertise in these kinds of cases, the Southern District of New York, was just embarking on its prosecution of insider trading cases arising from the Rajaratnam tapes, which soon proved a gold mine of good cases that absorbed a huge amount of the attention of the securities fraud unit of that office. While I want to stress again that I have no inside information, as a former chief of that unit I would venture to guess that the cases involving the financial crisis were parceled out to Assistants who also had insider trading cases. Which do you think an Assistant would devote most of her attention to:  an insider trading case that was already nearly ready to go to indictment and that might lead to a highvisibility trial, or a financial crisis case that was just getting started, would take years to complete, and had no guarantee of even leading to an indictment? Of course, she would put her energy into the insider trading case, and if she was lucky, it would go to trial, she would win, and she would then take a job with a large law firm. And in the process, the financial fraud case would get lost in the shuffle.

Alternative priorities, in short, is, I submit, one of the reasons the financial fraud cases were not brought, especially cases against high level individuals that would take many years, many investigators, and a great deal of expertise to investigate.  But a second, and less salutary, reason for not bringing such cases is the Government’s own involvement in the underlying circumstances that led to the financial crisis.

On the one hand, the government, writ large, had a hand in creating the conditions that encouraged the approval of dubious mortgages. It was the government, in the form of Congress, that repealed Glass-Steagall, thus allowing certain banks that had previously viewed mortgages as a source of interest income to become instead deeply involved in securitizing pools of mortgages in order to obtain the much greater profits available from trading. It was the government, in the form of both the executive and the legislature, that encouraged deregulation, thus weakening the power and oversight not only of the S.E.C. but also of such diverse banking overseers as the O.T.S. and the O.C.C. It was the government, in the form of the Fed, that kept interest rates low in part to encourage mortgages. It was the government, in the form of the executive, that strongly encouraged banks to make loans to low-income persons who might have previously been regarded as too risky to warrant a mortgage. It was the government, in the form of the government-sponsored entities known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, that helped create the fora-time insatiable market for mortgage-backed securities. And it was the government, pretty much across the board, that acquiesced in the ever greater tendency not to require meaningful documentation as a condition of obtaining a mortgage, often preempting in this regard state regulations designed to assure greater mortgage quality and a borrower’s ability to repay.

The result of all this was the mortgages that later became known as “liars’ loans.” They were increasingly risky; but what did the banks care, since they were making their money from the securitizations; and what did the government care, since they  were helping to boom the economy and helping voters to realize their dream of owning a home.

Moreover, the government was also deeply enmeshed in the aftermath of the financial crisis. It was the government that proposed the shotgun marriages of Bank of America with Merrill Lynch, of J.P. Morgan with Bear Stearns, etc. If, in the process, mistakes were made and liabilities not disclosed, was it not partly the government’s fault?

Please do not misunderstand me. I am not alleging that the Government knowingly participated in any of the fraudulent practices alleged by the Financial Inquiry Crisis Commission and others. But what I am suggesting is that the Government was deeply involved, from beginning to end, in helping create the conditions that could lead to such fraud, and that this would give a prudent prosecutor pause in deciding whether to indict a C.E.O. who might, with some justice, claim that he was only doing what he fairly believed the Government wanted him to do.

 The final factor I would mention is both the most subtle and the most systemic of the three, and arguably the most important, and it is the shift that has occurred over the past 30 years or more from focusing on prosecuting high-level individuals to focusing on prosecuting companies and other institutions. It is true that prosecutors have brought criminal charges against companies for well over a hundred years, but, until relatively recently, such prosecutions were the exception, and prosecutions of companies without simultaneous prosecutions of their managerial agents were even rarer. The reasons were obvious. Companies do not commit crimes; only their agents do. And while a company might get the benefit of some such crimes, prosecuting the company would inevitably punish, directly or indirectly, the many employees and shareholders who were totally innocent.   Moreover, under the law of most U.S. jurisdictions, a company cannot be criminally liable unless at least one managerial agent has committed the crime in question; so why not prosecute the agent who actually committed the crime?

 In recent decades, however, prosecutors have been increasingly attracted to prosecuting companies, often even without indicting a single individual. This shift has often been rationalized as part of an attempt to transform “corporate cultures,” so as to prevent future such crimes; and, as a result, it has taken the form of “deferred prosecution agreements” or even “non-prosecution agreements,” in which the company, under threat of criminal prosecution, agrees to take various prophylactic measures to prevent future wrongdoing. But in practice, I suggest, it has led to some lax and dubious behavior on the part of prosecutors, with deleterious results.    

If you are a prosecutor attempting to discover the individuals responsible for an apparent financial fraud, you go about your business in much the same way you go after mobsters or drug kingpins: you start at the bottom and, over many months or years, slowly work your way up. Specifically, you start by “flipping” some lower level participant in the fraud whom you can show was directly responsible for making one or more false material misrepresentations but who is willing to cooperate in order to reduce his sentence, and – aided by the substantial prison penalties now available in white collar cases – you go up the ladder. For a detailed example of how this works, I recommend Kurt Eichenwald’s well-known book The Informant, which describes how FBI agents, over a period of three years, uncovered the huge price-fixing conspiracy involving high-level executives at Archer Daniels, all of whom were successfully prosecuted.

But if your priority is prosecuting the company, a different scenario takes place. Early in the investigation, you invite in counsel to the company and explain to him or her why you suspect fraud. He or she responds by assuring you that the company wants to cooperate and do the right thing, and to that end the company has hired a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, now a partner at a respected law firm, to do an internal investigation. The company’s counsel asks you to defer your investigation until the company’s own internal investigation is completed, on the condition that the company will share its results with you. In order to save time and resources, you agree. Six months later the company’s counsel returns, with a detailed report showing that mistakes were made but that the company is now intent on correcting them. You and the company then agree that the company will enter into a deferred prosecution agreement that couples some immediate fines with the imposition of expensive but internal prophylactic measures. For all practical purposes the case is now over. You are happy because you believe that you have helped prevent future crimes; the company is happy because it has avoided a devastating indictment; and perhaps the happiest of all are the executives, or former executives, who actually committed the underlying misconduct, for they are left untouched. 

I suggest that this is not the best way to proceed. Although it is supposedly justified in terms of preventing future crimes, I suggest that the future deterrent value of successfully prosecuting individuals far outweighs the prophylactic benefits of imposing internal compliance measures that are often little more than window-dressing. Just going after the company is also both technically and morally suspect. It is technically suspect because, under the law, you should not indict or threaten to indict a company unless you can prove beyond a reasonable doubt  that some managerial agent of the company committed the alleged crime; and if you can prove that, why not indict the manager?  And from a moral standpoint, punishing a company and its many innocent employees and shareholders for the crimes committed by some unprosecuted individuals seems contrary to elementary notions of moral responsibility.

These criticisms take on special relevance, however, in the instance of investigations growing out of the financial crisis, because, as noted, the Department of Justice’s position, until at least very, very recently, is that going after the suspect institutions poses too great a risk to the nation’s economic recovery. So you don’t go after the companies, at least not criminally, because they are too big to jail; and you don’t go after the individuals, because that would involve the kind of years-long investigations that you no longer have the experience or the resources to pursue.

In conclusion, I want to stress again that I have no idea whether the financial crisis that is still causing so many of us so much pain and despondency was the product, in whole or in part, of fraudulent misconduct. But if it was — as various governmental authorities have asserted it was –- then, the failure of the government to bring to justice those responsible for such colossal fraud bespeaks weaknesses in our prosecutorial system that need to be addressed.

Living Lies, Telling It Like It Is! Thank You!


New post on Livinglies’s Weblog

Federal Agent Misconduct in Favor of BofA and McCarthy Holthus and Levine law firm?

http://livinglies.wordpress.com/2013/09/03/federal-agent-misconduct-in-favor-of-bofa-and-mccarthy-holthus-and-levine-law-firm/

by Neil Garfield

HAS FORECLOSURE DEFENSE BECOME A TERROR THREAT?

WHO IS TERRIFIED HERE?

This is a story about abuse of power or abuse of apparent power. The object is to cover-up crimes that remain largely undetected because the complex maze created by the “Thirteen Banks.”The stakes could not be higher. Either the current major Banks will be sustained or they will come crashing down with a feeding frenzy on a carcass of a predator that stole tens of trillions of dollars from multiple countries, hundreds of millions of people, and millions of homes across the world that should, by all accounts under the Law, still belong to the owner who was displaced by foreclosure. The banks are willing to do anything and they are paying outsize fees and other legal expenses (topping $100 Billion now).

The agents involved — Mike Lum from Homeland Security, Tim Hines, FBI Agent, and Sean Locksa, FBI agent — were either moonlighting (the agents say they were acting in their official capacity) and using their badges in appropriately or they were sent to intimidate litigants with Bank of America represented by McCarthy Holthus and Levine. A few years back, I received reports that the law firm, and in particular attorney Levine, had sent letters to local prosecutors to request action against people who were defending their property from foreclosure. The agents admitted to Blomberg today that they received a “tip” and that “it” was “no longer” a criminal manner and that they had ended their investigation.

In one prior case I saw a letter and I believe I might have seen an affidavit signed by Levine. The result was a series of indictments against one individual that were later dismissed. I have no information on the other cases all dating back to around 2010. I know one of the people, the one who I know was indicted, spent the last bit of her money hiring a criminal attorney to defend her. The case was “settled with a dismissal.” She subsequently lost two homes that were previously unencumbered in a foreclosure where different parties stepped in to foreclose than the ones who asked for lift stay in her bankruptcy. None of the parties were creditors or properly identified.

I now believe I have enough information to connect the dots, and raise the question as to whether members of local, federal and state law enforcement are colluding (or are being wrongfully used by the suggestion of false information) with Bank of America and at least one law firm — McCarthy Holthus and Levine — in which litigants and perhaps witnesses are intimidated into submission to wrongful foreclosures. The information contained in this article relates primarily to Arizona and to a lesser degree, California. I have no information on any other such activity in any other state of the union.

It also appears as though Bank of America and McCarthy Holthus and Levine were taking advantage of some sloppiness at the Post Office, for which the Postmaster in Simi Valley has apologized and sent a refund to the complainant, Darrell Blomberg whose story can be read below. The interesting thing here is that Blomberg reports that McCarthy Holthus and Levine directly received a letter that was addressed to Celia Mora, a suspected robo signor who apparently lives in Simi Valley, according to the post office, but whose mail bears a San Diego postmark.

The joint terrorism task force supposedly represented by the three men identified above, will not answer calls relating to this matter. Thus we only have Blomberg’s report and my own information and analysis — and of course public record. We do have a callback received today by Blomberg who reports that the agents answered a limited number of questions.

The information contained in this report is substantially corroborated by another source who, like Blomberg I consider to have the highest integrity and who was also visited this past week by the same agents who visited Blomberg. Since no specific act was alleged in the interviews except the perfectly legal request to the post office to confirm an address of a potential witness and test mailings to see who was receiving the mailings, it is hard to conclude anything other than that these agents were being used officially or unofficially to intimidate litigants who have been successful at defending their homes in foreclosure for years, and to intimidate them into ceasing their factual and investigative help to other homeowners who are also being wrongfully foreclosed.

If these interviews were sanctioned by the terrorism task force, the FBI or Homeland security it clearly represents the use of Federal law enforcement authority for the benefit of gaining a civil advantage — a crime in most jurisdictions. How high the orders went in those organization I do not know. If there were no such orders and these agents were doing a “favor” then they are subject to discipline for misuse of their badge and deliberately misleading the persons interviewed into thinking that this was an official investigation. The agencies involved might be negligent in supervising the activity of these agents. Neither of the sources for this story have any mark on their record except the mark of distinction — one having worked for decades in law enforcement in economic crimes.

Was Darrel Blomberg getting too close to the truth?

In litigation, one of the points raised by Blomberg was that Celia Mora — allegedly signed an affidavit perhaps by herself and perhaps as a robo signor. The issue of forgery didn’t come up. There was a San Diego post mark same day as the affidavit was allegedly signed 160 miles away. Blomberg’s position was Mora had no actual authority no actual executive position or managerial position, and signed clerically under instruction without knowledge of the contents. That is it. The fact that McCarthy Holthus and Levine actually received the letter addressed to Mora through normal postal service leads one to believe that the affidavit may have been created at the law firm and perhaps even signed there in Arizona. Hence any criminal behavior suggested was not the work of Blomberg but could have been the work of the law firm or Bank of America. To my knowledge there is no investigation pending relating to the use of the mails, false documents, improper signatures, lack of authority or any of the issues presented by Blomberg.

From there it became a vague charge of harassment communicated by three Federal Agents. Harassment was the word used by the agents in the interview with Blomberg and the interview with my other source. But no specific act was stated even in passing as to what act would be investigated as harassment, no less a matter of national security. More telling, when the agents left both interviews, neither source was instructed or requested to stop any specific act. That leads to the question, if there was no conduct they sought to stop, why were they there at all?

Note that McCarthy Malthus and Levine has been replaced by the law firm of Bryan Cave since June, 2013 in Blomberg’s case. Generally speaking Greg Iannelli, Esq. handles the more sensitive pieces of litigation that could blow the lid off of the fraudulent scheme of securitization.

Read Blomberg’s account here —> 2013-08-29, Unexpected Visit from the National Joint Terrorism Task Force

Background and analysis: Why do the banks continue to use low paid clerical workers to sign affidavits and other documents for which they obviously lack authority or knowledge? Why won’t a true executive with true authority and actual personal knowledge based upon his or her own actual observation, investigation and analysis to make sure the foreclosure is proper as to the property, the persons, the balance due and the existence of a default — especially with reference to the actual creditor’s books of account?

Convenience doesn’t cover it. With legal costs topping $100 Billion it would be impossible to pass the giggle test on any explanation of convenience when it comes to the paperwork. My conclusion is that it is worth getting embarrassed in court as long as the number of times is small enough that the overall scheme is not toppled. The use of clerical personnel to sign and approve documents relating to foreclosure is akin to allowing teller’s decide whether you can have a loan on that new car or new house. It doesn’t happen. If it doesn’t happen when the “loan” goes out, then it is fair to assume that the same standards would apply when the loan turns bad and comes back in.

Think about it. The Banks are reporting record profits. U. S. Bank reported $42 Billion in just one quarter. They are attributing their profits to proprietary trading — something I have attributed to laundering the illicit retention of funds that should have been used to pay investors the principal and accrued interest that was due on the promise of investment banks when they issued bogus mortgage bonds. That money was received by the Banks as agents for the investors and therefore, whether paid or not, is a credit against the account receivable owned by the investors.

The Glaski appellate attorneys gratuitously admitted that the true owner of the debts will never be known. Yet the true relationship between the homeowners and the lenders is regarded as known and enforceable. In short, the position of the Banks is that we don’t know who this money belongs to but it must belong to someone so we are going to collect it and foreclose. We’ll get back to you later on what we did with the money. The Banks are required to take that idiotic position because (a) it is still working in court and (b) they get to avoid liability to investors, guarantors, insurers, borrowers and government agencies that could exceed $10 trillion. So $100 Billion in legal expenses is only 1% of their exposure. It is easy to see how the Math works. If the legal expenses were a far more significant portion of the money the Banks were holding then they would find another way to deal with it. 

If the false trading and laundering of money was properly entered on the books as merely repatriating money that was hidden, the investors would be spared the losses that threaten our pensions and cities. It would also alleviate or eliminate the corresponding account payable due from homeowners, city budgets and other “borrowers” who were the unwitting pawns in a scheme to defraud investors. The collateral damage to all citizens, all taxpayers, all consumers, all workers and all homeowners has been obvious since 2007.

The extraordinary story is aggravated by the knowledge that the legal expenses of the Banks has now topped $100 Billion. Like I said, think about it. Nobody spends $100 Billion unless it is worth it. It is worth the price because of the amount of liability they are avoiding, and the amount of money they stole that went offshore. The amount of the theft can be estimated in a variety of ways, and the results are always the same. They siphoned trillions of dollars from many countries. In the U.S. alone it appears that the total was in excess of $17 Trillion, which is $3 Trillion MORE than the total amount of lending on residential “loans.” Extrapolating the most recent profit report from U. S. Bank from a quarter (three months) to a year, that one Bank is reporting annual earnings from “proprietary” trading in excess of $160 Billion per year. That is one of 18 Banks that were involved in this crime against humanity. Do the math.

So the Banks retain money that they never legally earned at the expense of deceived investors, Cities and sovereign wealth funds AND at the expense of the “borrowers” in the “underlying” deals. And by not crediting the lenders, the corresponding reduction of the account payable from “Borrowers” is also absent. No consent for principal reduction is required because the balance has also been reduced or extinguished by payment. Follow the money trail and the results was astonish you. This is like organized crime with all the trimmings of governmental complicity.

Now I am reporting that based upon a pattern of conduct that appears particularly egregious in Arizona, this unholy alliance between the people who committed the wrongs and government is becoming apparent. Who would have imagined indictments and “investigations” of people litigating their cases against the Banks after the scale the crime became apparent in 2008-2009?

CAVEAT: The agents in the Blomberg interview insist they were acting in their official capacity and I take them at their word. My problem with that assumption is that it means the system is susceptible of manipulation by attorneys who have no problem playing dirty tricks to gain a civil advantage. Or, worse, it means that there are high level people in the system who are willing to look the other way when this behavior pops up.

By this point in the savings and loan scandal in the 1980’s more than 800 bank presidents and loan officers, along with mortgage brokers and originators had been convicted by a jury and were serving their sentences. This time the tally is zero. But the reverse is not true. Mortgage brokers and originators and investors who played the system against itself have been investigated, prosecuted and sentenced to prison. And even homeowners have been accused of crimes that were identical to the crimes committed by Banks on a much larger scale. Steal a million, go to jail. Steal a Trillion and get immunity because the finance system might not survive removing the criminals from our society. No longer a nation of laws we have become a nation of men, corrupt men, who continue to accumulate wealth and power as they channel their illicit gains into reported Bank “profits” and control over world natural resources.

For about three years I have been investigating an unholy alliance between a law firm, McCarthy Holthus and Levine, Bank of America, U.S. Bank and law enforcement. It appears as though they have some special influence and that local, state and Federal law enforcement agents are acting as collectors and intimidators outside the boundaries of the law. Prosecutors have followed this line of attack against those pro se litigants who are getting close to the truth that the foreclosures — all of them — were bogus, if they were based upon mortgages and deeds of trust carrying claims of securitization, arising from Assignment and Assumption Agreements, Pooling and Servicing Agreements, and false prospectuses to investors.

The attached report from Darrel Blomberg, a person of unparalleled integrity, tells the story of agents from the FBI who (whether they realized it or not) are clearly acting at the behest and for the benefit of Bank of America, who was represented by McCarthy Holthus and Levine. In the past week, the agents have been visiting at least two people based upon a “harassment” allegation. The agents declared themselves to be part of a joint terrorism task force. The act of harassment was a request for confirmation of address and confirmation of address that ended up both in the offices of Bank of America and the office of McCarthy Holthus and Levine. It was addressed to the U.S. Postmaster who apologized for gaffes in processing the requests and even refunded money to Blomberg. No investigation has been threatened by the U.S. Postal inspector against either the Bank or the law firm. And none has been threatened against Blomberg.

Having a few pages of the attempt to get address of a robo signor whose signature appears to have been forged, these agents have interviewed two people in Arizona that have been known to provide factual assistance to other homeowners and whose own cases have been spread out over many years as the Bank continues to fail in its attempt to claim ownership or verify the balance of the debt. These agents identified themselves as having been dispatched from the FBI, Homeland security and the joint task force. Whether they were merely moonlighting or were in fact dispatched by their superiors, it is clear that no criminal matter was under investigation, and that their purpose was to intimidate two people who fortunately are not easily intimidated. Based upon my investigation it appears as though that law Firm, McCarthy, Holthus and Levine who is frequently replaced by Bryan Cave, has been doing dirty work for the banks through contacts in law enforcement.

It is happening and this should be stopped before it becomes a commonplace act throughout the country.

In the final analysis the issue of ownership of the loan is going to unravel this mess because it is only then that we can look at the books of account and see what money is owed on the original account receivable for the creditor/investor/REMIC.

The analysis of ownership does not merely look to the agreements the parties entered into because the label parties give to a transaction does not determine its character. See Helvering v. Lazarus & Co. 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939). The analysis must examine the underlying economics and the attendant facts and circumstances to determine who owns the mortgage notes for tax purposes. See id. The court in In re Kemp documents in painful detail how Countrywide failed to transfer possession of a note to the pool backing a Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) so that Countrywide failed to comply with the requirements necessary for the mortgage to comply with the REMIC rules. See In re Kemp, 440 F.R. 624 (Bkrtcy D.N.J. 2010). Defendant in this case has done exactly what was adjudicated in Kemp, failure to sufficiently show a timely transfer that complied with the strict language of the trusts’ Agreements.

As the Kemp court notes, “[f]rom the maker’s standpoint, it becomes essential to establish that the person who demands payment of a negotiable note, or to whom payment is made, is the duly qualified holder. Otherwise, the obligor is exposed to the risk of double payment, or at least to the expense of litigation incurred to prevent duplicative satisfaction of the instrument. These risks provide makers (Plaintiff in this case) with a recognizable interest in demanding proof of the chain of title” (specifically referring to the trust participants). 440 B.R. at 631 (quoting Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163, 168 (3d Cir. N.J. 1988). And because the originator did not comply with the legal niceties, the beneficial owner of the debt, the trustee, cannot file its proof of claim either. 

Another Great Article From Living Lies, Telling It Like It Is!


LAST CHANCE FOR JUSTICE

Posted on August 19, 2013 by Neil Garfield

“We are still in the death grip of the banks as they attempt to portray themselves as the bulwarks of society even as they continue to rob us of homes, lives, jobs and vitally needed capital which is being channeled into natural resources so that when we commence the gargantuan task of repairing our infrastructure we can no longer afford it and must borrow the money from the thieves who created the gaping hole in our economy threatening the soul of our democracy.” Neil Garfield, livinglies.me

We all know that dozens of people rose to power in Europe and Asia in the 1930′s and 1940′s who turned the world on its head and were responsible for the extermination of tens of millions of people. World War II still haunts us as it projected us into an arms race in which we were the first and only country to kill all the people who lived in two cities in Japan. The losses on both sides of the war were horrendous.
Some of us remember the revelations in 1982 that the United States actively recruited unrepentant Nazi officers and scientists for intelligence and technological advantages in the coming showdown with what was known as the Soviet Union. Amongst the things done for the worst war criminals was safe passage (no prosecution for war crimes) and even new identities created by the United States Department of Justice. Policy was created that diverted richly deserved consequences into rich rewards for knowledge. With WWII in the rear view mirror policy-makers decided to look ahead and prepare for new challenges.

Some of us remember the savings and loans scandals where banks nearly destroyed everything in the U.S. marketplace in the 1970′s and 1980′s. Law enforcement went into high gear, investigated, and pieced together the methods and complex transactions meant to hide the guilt of the main perpetrators in and out of government and the business world. More than 800 people went to jail. Of course, none of the banks had achieved the size that now exists in our financial marketplace.

Increasing the mass of individual financial institutions produced a corresponding capacity for destruction that eclipsed anything imagined by anyone outside of Wall Street. The exponentially increasing threat was ignored as the knowledge of Einstein’s famous equation faded into obscurity. The possibilities for mass destruction of our societies was increasing exponentially as the mass of giant financial service companies grew and the accountability dropped off when they were allowed to incorporate and even sell their shares publicly, replacing a system, hundreds of years old in which partners were ultimately liable for losses they created.

The next generation of world dominators would be able to bring the world to its knees without firing a shot or gassing anyone. Institutions grew as malignancies on steroids and created the illusion of contributing half our gross domestic product while real work, real production and real inventions were constrained to function in a marketplace that had been reduced by 1/3 of its capacity — leaving the banks in control of  $7 trillion per year in what was counted as gross domestic product. Our primary output by far was trading paper based upon dubious and fictitious underlying transactions; if those transactions had existed, the share of GDP attributed to financial services would have remained at a constant 16%. Instead it grew to half of GDP.  The “paradox” of financial services becoming increasingly powerful and generating more revenues than any other sector while the rest of the economy was stagnating was noted by many, but nothing was done. The truth of this “paradox” is that it was a lie — a grand illusion created by the greatest salesmen on Wall Street.

So even minimum wage lost 1/3 of its value adjusted for inflation while salaries, profits and bonuses were conferred upon people deemed as financial geniuses as a natural consequence of believing the myths promulgated by Wall Street with its control over all forms of information, including information from the government.

But calling out Wall Street would mean admitting that the United States had made a wrong turn with horrendous results. No longer the supreme leader in education, medical care, crime, safety, happiness and most of all prospects for social and economic mobility, the United States had become supreme only through its military strength and the appearance of strength in the world of high finance, its currency being the world’s reserve despite the reality of the ailing economy and widening inequality of wealth and opportunity — the attributes of a banana republic.

All of us remember the great crash of 2008-2009. It was as close as could be imagined to a world wide nuclear attack, resulting in the apparent collapse of economies, tens of millions of people being reduced to poverty, tossed out of their homes, sleeping in cars, divorces, murder, riots, suicide and the loss of millions of jobs on a rising scale (over 700,000 per month when Obama took office) that did not stop rising until 2010 and which has yet to be corrected to figures that economists say would mean that our economy is functioning at proper levels. Month after month more than 700,000 people lost their jobs instead of a net gain of 300,000 jobs. It was a reversal of 1 million jobs per month that could clean out the country and every myth about us in less than a year.

The cause lay with misbehavior of the banks — again. This time the destruction was so wide and so deep that all conditions necessary for the collapse of our society and our government were present. Policy makers, law enforcement and regulators decided that it was better to maintain the illusion of business as usual in a last ditch effort to maintain the fabric of our society even if it meant that guilty people would go free and even be rewarded. It was a decision that was probably correct at the time given the available information, but it was a policy based upon an inaccurate description of the disaster written and produced by the banks themselves. Once the true information was discovered the government made another wrong turn — staying the course when the threat of collapse was over. In a sense it was worse than giving Nazi war criminals asylum because at the time they were protected by the Department of Justice their crimes were complete and there existed little opportunity for them to repeat those crimes. It could be fairly stated that they posed no existing threat to safety of the country. Not so for the banks.

Now as all the theft, deceit and arrogance are revealed, the original premise of the DOJ in granting the immunity from prosecution was based upon fraudulent information from the very people to whom they were granting safe passage. We have lost 5 million homes in foreclosure from their past crimes, but we remain in the midst of the commission of crimes — another 5 million illegal, wrongful foreclosures is continuing to wind its way through the courts.

Not one person has been prosecuted, not one statement has been made acknowledging the crimes, the continuing deceit in sworn filings with regulators, and the continuing drain on the economy and our ability to finance and capitalize on innovation to replace the lost productivity in real goods and services.

We are still in the death grip of the banks as they attempt to portray themselves as the bulwarks of society even as they continue to rob us of homes, lives, jobs and vitally needed capital which is being channeled into natural resources so that when we commence the gargantuan task of repairing our infrastructure we can no longer afford it and must borrow the money from the thieves who created the gaping hole in our economy threatening the soul of our democracy. If the crimes were in the rear view mirror one could argue that the policy makers could make decisions to protect our future. But the crimes are not just in the rear view mirror. More crimes lie ahead with the theft of an equal number of millions of homes based on false and wrongful foreclosures deriving their legitimacy from an illusion of debt — an illusion so artfully created that most people still believe the debts exist. Without a very sophisticated knowledge of exotic finance it seems inconceivable that a homeowner could receive the benefits of a loan and at the same time or shortly thereafter have the debt extinguished by third parties who were paid richly for doing so.

Job creation would be unleashed if we had the courage to stop the continuing fraud. It is time for the government to step forward and call them out, stop the virtual genocide and let the chips fall where they might when the paper giants collapse. It’s complicated, but that is your job. Few people lack the understanding that the bankers behind this mess belong in jail. This includes regulators, law enforcement and even judges. but the “secret” tacit message is not to mess with the status quo until we are sure it won’t topple our whole society and economy.

The time is now. If we leave the bankers alone they are highly likely to cause another crash in both financial instruments and economically by hoarding natural resources until the prices are intolerably high and we all end up pleading for payment terms on basic raw materials for the rebuilding of infrastructure. If we leave them alone another 20 million people will be displaced as more than 5 million foreclosures get processed in the next 3-4 years. If we leave them alone, we are allowing a clear and present danger to the future of our society and the prospects for safety and world peace. Don’t blame Wall Street — they are just doing what they were sent to do — make money. You don’t hold the soldier responsible for firing a bullet when he was ordered to do so. But you do blame the policy makers that him or her there. And you stop them when the policy is threatening another crash.

Stop them now, jail the ones who can be prosecuted, and take apart the large banks. IMF economists and central bankers around the world are looking on in horror at the new order of things hoping that when the United States has exhausted all other options, they will finally do the right thing. (see Winston Churchill quote to that effect).

But forget not that the ultimate power of government is in the hands of the people at large and that the regulators and law enforcement and judges are working for us, on our nickle. Action like Occupy Wall Street is required and you can see the growing nature of that movement in a sweep that is entirely missed by those who arrogantly pull the levers of power now. OWS despite criticism is proving the point — it isn’t new leaders that will get us out of this — it is the withdrawal of consent of the governed one by one without political affiliation or worshiping sound sound biting, hate mongering politicians.

People have asked me why I have not until now endorsed the OWS movement. The reason was that I wanted to give them time to see if they could actually accomplish the counter-intuitive result of exercising power without direct involvement in a corrupt political process. They have proven the point and they are likely to be a major force undermining the demagogues and greedy bankers and businesses who care more about their bottom line than their society that gives them the opportunity to earn that bottom line.

New Fraud Evidence Shows Trillions Of Dollars In Mortgages Have No Owner
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/08/13/2460891/new-fraud-evidence-shows-trillions-of-dollars-in-mortgages-have-no-owner/

Wells Fargo appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court


Wells Fargo appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals which certified the above questions to this Court at the Trustee’s request. We address each certified question in turn.

1. In order for a security deed to be in recordable form, it must be attested by an official witness and an unofficial witness. OCGA §§44-14-61 and 44-14-33. Specifically, OCGA §44-14-33 provides that a security deed “must be attested by or acknowledged before an officer as prescribed for the attestation or acknowledgment of deeds of bargain and sale; and, in the case of real property, a [security deed] must also be attested or acknowledged by one additional witness.” This Court has recently held that “a security deed is ‘duly filed, recorded, and indexed’ only if the clerk responsible for recording determines, from the face of the document, that it is in proper form for recording, meaning that it is attested or acknowledged by a proper officer and (in the case of real property) an additional witness.” U.S. Bank N.A. v. Gordon, 289 Ga. 12, 15 (709 SE2d 258) (2011). A deed that is not properly attested is ineligible for recording. Id. The recording of a properly attested security deed serves as constructive notice to all subsequent bona fide purchasers. OCGA §44-14-33. In this case, because the eight-paged security deed lacked the signature of an unofficial witness, it was not in recordable form as required by OCGA § 44-14-33 and did not provide constructive notice. See U.S. Bank N.A.  v. Gordon, supra, 289 Ga. at 15; Higdon v. Gates, 238 Ga. 105, 107 (231 SE2d 345) (1976). See also In Re Yearwood, 318 B.R. 227, 229 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (a patently defective security deed does not provide constructive notice).

Despite the facial defect in the security deed at issue, Wells Fargo urges that because the waiver was attested in accordance with OCGA § 44-14-33 and because the waiver was incorporated into the security deed by reference, the security deed was thereby properly attested and in recordable form. We disagree. While we are not bound by the United States bankruptcy courts’ interpretations of Georgia law, we nevertheless find In re Fleeman, 81 B.R. 160 (M.D. Ga. 1987) to be analogous to this case and persuasive to our resolution of the question before us. In Fleeman, the debtor executed a security deed and an adjustable rate rider. While the rider contained the signature of an unofficial witness, the security deed did not. As with the instant case, the deed and rider were contemporaneously submitted to the superior court for recording. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the unofficial witness issued and recorded with the superior court an affidavit stating that she had witnessed the debtor sign the security deed. One of the arguments advanced by the lender was that the attached and fully attested rider was sufficient to validate the security deed, in particular because the security deed incorporated the covenants and agreements of the rider. Id. at 162-163. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia rejected this argument reasoning as follows:

By attesting a document, an individual signifies that he has witnessed the execution of the particular document. Black’s Law Dictionary  117 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). 

Thus the signature of [the unofficial witness], which appears on the adjustable rate rider, attests to the proper execution of that document only. Although the adjustable rate rider is incorporated into the terms of the deed to secure debt, the deed to secure debt itself remains improperly attested and ineligible for recordation.  Id. at 163.3

We agree with the above analysis. As in Fleeman, the attestation of the waiver in this case cannot be substituted for the proper attestation of the security deed. Such a construct would be false and contrary to the purpose of attestation, namely for the witness to verify that the document in question has been executed by the signatories. Allowing a more lenient rule as Wells Fargo urges would likely lead to more  complications than it would resolve for lenders, debtors, and subsequent purchasers alike. As we admonished in Bank N.A. v. Gordon, supra, 289 Ga. at 17, it costs nothing for lenders or their agents to review their paperwork to make sure the proper signatures are in place before submitting documents to the superior court clerk for recording. Accordingly, we answer the first certified question in the negative.

2. Having answered the first certified question in the negative, we now address the second certified question. Wells Fargo argues that the fully executed, attested, and recorded waiver in and of itself was sufficient to provide “inquiry notice”  such that a bona fide purchaser would be prompted to maie inquiries as to the existence of a security deed in the property’s chain of title.

We disagree. The rule regarding inquiry notice is summarized as follows:

[A] purchaser of land in this state “is charged with notice of every fact shown by the records, and is presumed to know every other fact which an examination suggested by the records would have disclosed.” [Cits.] …Although “it is essential that the description of the land in the conveyance should be reasonably certain and sufficient to enable subsequent purchasers to identify the premises intended to be conveyed; but while the description may be inaccurate, meager or erroneous, yet if it is expressed in such a manner or connected with such attendant circumstances as that a purchaser should be deemed to be put upon inquiry, if he fails to prosecute this inquiry he is chargeable with all the notice he might have obtained had he done so.” [Cit.]  Deljoo v. SunTrust Mortgage, 284 Ga. 438, 439-440 (668 SE2d 245) (2008).

See OCGA § 23-1-17 provides that “inquiry notice” is “[n]otice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry shall be notice of everything to which it is afterward found that such  inquiry might have led.

When, however, a property description is “manifestly too meager, imperfect, or uncertain to serve as adequate means of identification,” a court may adjudge it “insufficient as a matter of law” for a subsequent purchaser to be put upon inquiry. Id. at 440. In this case, while the waiver identifies the lender and grantors (debtor and co-debtor), it only generically references a security deed and fails to identify or describe the property purportedly to be conveyed or encumbered by the referenced security deed. In the total absence of identification or description of the property subject to the security deed, the waiver itself would not place a bona fide purchaser on notice that he should make further inquiry. Accordingly, we answer the second certified question in the negative.

Certified questions answered. All the Justices concur.

 

 

Lenders, Banksters, Courts, and all you other liars and thieves…


¤

COMES NOW… proceeding in Propria Persona, and respectfully files Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association’s Motion to Dismiss, and shows this Honorable Court the following pertinent facts:

Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) has filed their Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to O.C.G.A.§ 9-11-12(b), and on the claims that Plaintiff is a borrower who defaulted in repayment of his mortgage loan, resulting in the foreclosing on the real property which served as collateral for the loan. Plaintiff contends that had the banking and mortgage industry not been so greedy, they would not have over inflated the values through falsified appraisals on properties; they would not have been telling Borrowers not to worry, they can work out an affordable loan that will get you into that house you always dreamed of, while knowing in the back of their minds, that when the Borrower claims that they believed and relied upon their lenders, and what they had been told; the response would then be that the relationship had been nothing more than creditor – debtor and that you should not have relied upon the lies you had been told, because you are at different ends of the spectrum, with totally different interests. My Grandmother would say that America has gone to hell in a handbag.

We have headed into an era where the foreclosing entities are allowed to forge and falsify documents, because the borrower defaulted on their payments, and they need those documents that they are forging and falsifying in order to foreclose upon that Borrower, and the original documents no longer exist. Plaintiff was of the belief, that if you signed a contract, that the Original contract had to be kept in order for it to be collected upon, simple contract law. As it is in these foreclosure/wrongful foreclosure cases, the only time the documents are referred to contracts, is when the documents are referred to as in the Borrower failed to honor the contract by timely making their payments every month. Any other time, the words contract, does not exist. Should a Borrower mention the word, or words Note or Promissory Note, it is sacrilege and the Borrower is “claiming the show me the note theory”, or “vapor money theory”, which is a cue to the Court to dismiss because Georgia does not have a law that the foreclosing entity has to show you the Note. And then, there are the entities that think that they can talk to, and treat the pro se litigants any way they please.

No one would be in this mess, if Fannie Mae, US Bank,Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Aurora, Litton, Taylor Bean and Whitaker, Cenlar, GMAC, Wachovia, Popular, Countrywide, MERS, and a whole slew of other entities had not gotten greedy, eased the underwriting, slacked off on checking tax forms and employment, and had not lied that the borrowers could afford it, this loan will allow you to buy the home you always wanted.

The Old Crows and the Gatekeeper


A conversation with a friend…

I know what you mean about the clerks in your county throwing things out for a small sum…we have, (well one old bird that is left-the other one died), she is no joke, in her 80’s. She will do “favors” for certain people, but they have to be people that are from certain firms, or that have the approval from either the court or the court clerk and master.

Everyone (that is not in the court system) refers to these old ladies as the “old crows”, and funny enough the way that the building is designed- the chancery court clerks set off to themselves and it kind of looks like a birds nest, this is referred to as “the crows’ nest”. My mother refers to this old hateful old thing as the gate keeper.

Anyway, my mother worked for the city for over 23 years before she took early retirement, and would walk on her lunch breaks. Well, this old crow (the one that is still alive) was also walking and came in behind my mother (I think that she thought that my mom was someone else), but she stated that the chemical that she has to use to “take signatures off of documents” has eaten the skin off of her fingers, and her fingers were so sore that she couldn’t even hold a pen (which explains to me why the chancery courts require the original document and only the original document). Mom stated after she said that, that the old crow looked up and realized that it was my mom and not who she thought. My mom said that the old crow then darted off and that woman never spoke to my mom again. This happened after mom had been there either 12 or 13 years. This old crow avoided my mom like the plague for the next 10-11 years!